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Explanation facilities a r e  an important  
extension of the rule based paradigm. By using 
contrast why questions and a more textured 
notion of reasoning, a robust schema for 
simple explanations can be developed. 
INTRODUCTION 
At first glance it seems rather easy to characterize explanation. An 
explanation is a deductive argument that satisfies the conditions of 
empirical adequacy. [7] However, behind this apparently simple 
account can be found a great many issues. One of these concerns the 
pragmatics of explanation: deductive explanations often fail to explain 
anything to the person seeking the explanation. I will examine the 
pragmatic dimension of explanation and indicate how a more 
‘textured’ notion of reasoning can enhance the explanation facilities of 
the expert system paradigm. The domain of interest will be a general 
one in which there are objects, states of objects and causal paths 
between the objects. 
Among the facilities commonly found in expert system building 
tools are the why? and how? explanation facilities. Typically the why? 
facility is engaged at a prompt and reports the rule that is currently 
being examined, while the how? facility requests the user to identify a 
particular parameter for which the system has set a value and reports 
the rule by which it was set. Such facilities operate in the style of 
deductive explanation. In both there are conditional claims (laws or 
rules) together with specified conditions (initial conditions or user 
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entered values) that deductively lead to particular conclusions (the 
explanandum, or the values of parameters). Deductive explanations 
have been criticized for attending more to the grounds of an 
explanation than the particular explanation of a given event. [8] 
Similarly the how? and why? facilities attend more to the rules of the 
system than to the events to be explained. The sorts of explanation 
offered within the expert system should not be confused with the 
sorts of explanations that might be considered ordinary in other 
contexts. The explanation facilities might explain, for example, why 
one would come to think that a particular part failed, but would not 
explain why the part failed. Such criticism points to the importance of 
pragmatic considerations in explanation. 
VARIETIES OF EXPLANATION 
Explanations come in many forms. Scientific explanations are one 
well studied group of explanations. One form of scientific explanation 
proceeds from a scientific law, theory or model to  a deductive 
account of a phenomenon. Although Hempel’s original formulation of 
such  deductive nomological (DN) explanations has been much 
criticized, it provides both a good starting point and a base that, with 
suitable extensions and amendments, can capture a large range of 
scientific explanations. 
The D N  model of scientific explanation invites comparison to the 
notion of backward chaining in expert systems. The explanandun is 
known and the collection of scientific principles is searched in an 
effort to find the conditions which, if satisfied, would constitute the 
explanans. The collection of principles retrieved along with the 
specified conditions constitute the explanation of the phenomenon as 
described in the  explanandum. Thus, the pattern of such  an 
explanation would be: 
<explanandurn asserted as true> because <explanans retrieved by 
backward chaining>. 
Within the range of DN explanations, a distinction must be drawn 
between the epistemic and ontic modes of explanation. The epistemic 
mode employs the sort of reasoning, captured in rules, that an expert 
or scientist would use  in solving a problem or producing an 
explanation. The ontic mode concentrates on the scientific principles 
and laws which, if true, would produce a sound deductive argument 
with the explanandum as the conclusion. Taking a liberal approach to 
both scientific explanation and expert systems, it will be assumed that 
the epistemic mode can be considered to be the locus of explanatory 
activities. Thus, the explanation produced by the operation of an 
epistemic system will provide the reasons for asserting that the 
explanandum is true. 
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Accepting the epistemic mode as primary suggests that the 
operation of an expert system itself can be taken as an instance of 
explanation. However, more is required since what is often at issue is 
either why certain rules are used or why there are such rules at all. A 
simple approach to this can be taken by adding the idea that rules 
themselves are often linked to some backing that explains the rule. 
Though this is only a small deviation from the epistemic mode of DN 
explanation, it would provide for richer, more informative, 
explanations. 
Other explanatory patterns require a greater divergence from the 
DN model. 
In some cases the focal point of explanation is why one member of 
a particular kind behaved in a way that the other members of that kind 
did not. For example, one might want to explain why two parts of the 
same kind came to be in different states. Here it seems reasonable to 
think that  an explanation is provided by a list of the property 
differences between the two instances. The pattern of such an  
explanation is unlike the DN pattern since the focus is difference and 
not deduction. The pattern of such an explanation would be: 
<differences in instances> because <differences in kinds>. 
In other cases the focal point of the explanation is a temporal or 
causal account of a how an object came to be in a particular state. Such 
explanations are akin to historical explanations in which one is 
searching for a significant event that leads to a particular outcome. 
Such explanations are unlike DN explanations since the focus is 
temporal and not logical. The pattern of such an explanation would be: 
<state of object> because <chain of events>. 
The variety of explanations in the context of scientific reasoning 
strongly suggests that there will be more than one explanation pattern. 
In turn this suggests that in the pragmatics of explanation attention 
must be paid to determining what sort of explanation is desired. 
WHY QUESTIONS AND THE VARIETIES OF EXPLANATION 
One can request an explanation in many different ways. One might 
ask ‘Why does parameter P have value V?’ or one might ask ‘How is it 
that the system is now asking this question?’ The former although 
asked as a why question is the province of the how? facility and the 
latter, though asked as a how question is the province of the why? 
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facility. For the sake of clarity and convenience I will assume that all 
requests for explanation can be represented as why questions, and 
suggest that all appropriate requests for explanation embody contrast 
why questions, ‘Why is it this rather than that?’ 
In the simple question ‘Why P?’ P represents the surface topic (ST) 
of the question and its assumed that P is true. However, if a context is 
not invoked, such questions are ambiguous. [lo, 11 The question ‘Why 
did part-234 fail?’ is ambiguous. At the level of the expert system (ES), 
it might be a request for an explanation of why the system inferred 
that part-234 failed rather than asking for a test to be performed on 
part-234. At the level of the causal process (CP), it might be a request 
for an explanation of why part-234 rather than part-123 failed, or a 
request for an explanation of why part-234 failed rather than 
continued to operate. Thus, why questions should be understood as 
making reference to some contrast class. ‘Why P?’ is a specialization of 
‘Why P rather than Q?’ when the contrast class is already understood. 
In the more general form ‘P rather than Q’ is the intended topic (IT) 
of the explanation, and it is assumed that P is true and Q is false. 
The contrast class for the IT must contain at least P and Q, but may 
contain other propositions. The propositions contained in the contrast 
class may be exclusive, inclusive or unspecified. If they are exclusive, 
then showing why P is true, will amount to explaining why Q is false. If 
they are inclusive, a separate account will be needed to show why Q is 
false. If they are unspecified, then the question should be treated as if 
it were an ST question. 
The particular items that appear in the contrast space can be 
generated by examining the instances or causal paths. If the IT refers 
to things that have instances, then the space would include all the 
instances of that type. For example, if the IT referred to the contrast 
of par t -234 and  par t -123 and  both par t s  were of the type 
philosophator, then the contrast space would be composed of all 
instances of philosophators. Alternatively, if the IT referred to the 
state of an object, then the space would be composed of all of the 
paths through the part. For example, if the IT referred to the failure of 
part-234 rather than its continued operation, then the contrast space 
would be composed of all the paths through part-234. I t  should be 
noted, however, that the state of a device could be determined by 
inference or by direct measure. If the state is determined by direct 
measure and cannot be inferred by the rules of the the ES, then the 
cause of the part’s state will be labeled as internal. If the state is either 
inferred by the rules or is measured but can be inferred from the 
rules, then it will be labeled as external. 
The integration of contrasting why questions with the varieties of 
explanatory patterns provides an environment in which the user can 
receive more meaningful explanations. Although the explanations are a 
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bit simple they do respond to the context and provide for multiple 
explanatory views. 
Diagram 1 summarizes the discussion to this point. Simply put the 
system is designed to have the user refine the ST to an IT. The system 
then checks for the truth of the assumptions, and if they are false 
issues a corrective explanation. The user then determines the level of 
the explanation, ES or CP. If the level is ES, then an ES explanation is 
assembled. If the level is CP, then the contrast spaces are constructed 
either by finding the instances of a particular kind of object or by 
finding all the paths through the object. Appropriate CP explanations 
are assembled unless the type of contrast is unspecified. If the type of 
contrast is unspecified, then the system returns for a further 
clarification of the IT. 
EXPLANATION 
Check False 
assumptions assumption 
True 
assumptions 
Diagram 
Instance Assemble 
contrast -- INSTANCE 
space EXPLANATION 
1. 
REASONINGS OF GREATER TEXTURE 
The final part of the system assembles the explanation. As should be 
clear from the inclusion of causal paths some modification of the basic 
representation of knowledge in the system is needed. The pattern of 
reasoning proposed by Toulmin, Reike and Janik can be understood as 
providing a pattern that extends the rule based paradigm to provide 
reasoning of greater ‘texture.’ [9, 31 In order to use the TRJ model for 
explanation within the expert system paradigm the basic parts of the 
model will be interpreted as follows: the grounds are the claims held 
in working memory, the warrants are the rules, the backings are the 
support for rules, the rebuttals are a set of rules for alternative 
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outcomes, and the claim is the parameter to be modified. Diagram 2 
illustrates this interpretation. 
c 3 
ES Backing 
I 
Warrants [Rules] 
Y 
Claims Grounds Diagram [Working memory] 
I I Two 
The additional resources of the TRJ model provide an effective way 
to assemble an explanation. If it is allowed that the rules of the expert 
system are an operationalized correlate of claims in a model of the 
system, then one set of backings will provide the details of the model 
in terms of causal paths. Further, if the expert system allows the 
creation of instances of types of objects, it should be relatively easy to 
isolate the type of the object in the consequent of the rule. Moreover, 
if multiple backings are  allowed, another set  of backings could 
establish why a particular rule has been formulated in terms of 
particular illustrative cases. 
The various explanations are assembled using the backings and 
rebuttals. An ES explanation indicates the rule being used along with 
its ES backing. Its form is, ‘Rule XXX was used to infer P because 
<backing>’. This basic form is expanded in the case of instance 
explanation by determining the differences between the conditions of 
the two objects. I ts  form is, ‘Part-XXX is in state S and p a r t - m  is not 
in that s ta te  because <differences in properties>’. The s t a t e  
explanations use CP backings to trace through the causal path to a 
point where an object deviates from its normal state and an internal 
cause is found. Its  form would be ‘Part-XXX is in state S because part- 
xxx entered state s and the path P links Part-XXX to part-xxx’. If the 
other item of the  IT provides an exclusive contrast, then the 
explanation is finished. If, however, the contrast is inclusive and the 
other item in IT is in the consequent of the rebuttal, then the form 
‘and not Q because <rebuttal>’ is added. 
LINKS T O  OTHER MECHANISMS 
The proposed simple model of explanation allows for a variety of 
explanation types, and these types provide links to the efforts of other 
researchers. 
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Although Schank examined common sense accounts of explanation, 
rather than the narrower field of scientific explanation focused upon 
here, his comments on cognitive understanding are helpful. (51 He 
suggests that for cognitive understanding, “the program must  be able 
to explain why it came to the conclusions it did, what hypotheses it 
rejected and why, how previous experiences influenced it to come u p  
with its hypotheses and so on.” [p. 15) This notion of cognitive 
understanding, however, is capable of two related, but distinct, 
readings. The first reading focuses upon how the program, as a 
program, came to a conclusion. In this sense the program must be able 
to explain the steps that it took. This notion seems to be captured in 
the idea of strategic explanation advanced by Schulman and Hayes- 
Roth. [6] They consider strategic explanations to be descriptions of 
the strategic plans and decisions that determine the system’s actions. 
The second reading focuses upon why the program came to the 
conclusion it did, given the hypotheses (theories) and  evidence 
represented in it. Suthers’ examination of the view appropriate to the 
expert seems to capture this reading. [7] He suggests that experts 
would expect programs to give summaries of case evaluations in the 
fields terminology supplemented with accounts of its reasoning and 
use of evidence. 
The two readings of Schank’s account of cognitive understanding 
are complementary and not competitive. The proposed simple model 
of explanation indicates a way in which the strengths of each can be 
combined to produce a robust framework. [4] Strategic explanations 
provide the detail needed to construct corrective and ES explanations, 
and  the views appropriate to the expert indicate the mechanisms 
required to construct instance and state explanations. 
CONCLUSION 
A preliminary prototype of a simple explanation system was 
constructed by Blake Ragsdell (University of Louisville) and  Lisa 
Wurzelbacher (Thomas More College). Although the system, based on 
the idea of storytelling, did not incorporate all of the principles of 
simple explanation, it did demonstrate the potential of the approach. 
The system incorporated a hypertext system, an inference engine, and 
facilities for constructing contrast type explanations. 
The continued development of such a system should prove to be 
valuable. By extending the resources of the expert system paradigm, 
the knowledge engineer is not forced to learn a new set of skills, and 
the domain knowledge already acquired by him is not lost. Further, 
both the  beginning user and the more advanced user  can be 
accommodated. For the beginning user, corrective explanations and 
ES explanations provide facilities for more clearly understanding the 
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way in which the system is functioning. For the more advanced user, 
the instance and state explanations allow him to focus on the issues at 
hand. 
The simple model of explanation attempts to exploit and show how 
the why? and how? facilities of the expert system paradigm can be 
extended by attending to the pragmatics of explanation and adding 
‘texture’ to the ordinary pattern of reasoning in a rule based system. 
* A n  earlier version of this paper was presented at the AAAI 
Workshop on Explanation (August 1988). I would like to thank the 
members of the workshop for helpful comments and criticisms. 
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